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Halbrook: The Swiss And The Nazis

THE SWISS AND THE NAZIS: HOW THE ALPINE REPUBLIC
SURVIVED IN THE SHADOW OF THE THIRD REICH
Stephen P. Halbrook

1

At the SAHS Annual Meeting on October 7, 2006, this author presented
his new book, The Swiss and the Nazis: How the Alpine Republic Survived
in the Shadow of the Third Reich (Casemate 2006). 2 To give the reader a
panorama of the book's contents, the following provides sample excerpts
from each chapter of the book.
While surrounded by the Axis powers in World War II, Switzerland
remained democratic and, unlike most of Europe, never succumbed to the
siren songs and threats of the Nazi goliath. This book tells the story with
emphasis on two voices rarely heard. One voice is that of scores of Swiss
who lived in those dark years,
told through oral history. They
mobilized to defend the country,
labored on the farms, and helped
refugees. The other voice is that
of Nazi Intelligence, those who
spied on the Swiss and planned
subversion
and
invasion.
Exhaustive documents from the
German
Military
Archives
reveals a chilling rendition of
attack plans which would be
dissuaded
in
part
by
Switzerland's
armed populace
and Alpine defenses.
Laced with unique maps and
Co un esy of Case mate Publi shing Co mpany
photos, the book is organized into
four units. The first, A War of
Words and Nerves, reveals German prewar subversion plans. Chapters also
depict how the Swiss mobilized an active "spiritual defense" of their
country, including the use of the press and cabaret as weapons against
'Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Ya.; Ph.D. Florida State University, J.D. Georgetown University.

In addition to books on American constitutional history, Halbrook is author of the awardwinning Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (1998), which was
also published as Die Schwei z im Visier, La Suisse encerclee, La Svizzera nel mirino, and
Cel: Szwajcaria . He is featured in Secret Passages: Episode 5, History Channel (Swiss
Alpine fortifications). See www .stephenhalbrook.com.
2
Casemate Publishers, 1016 Warrior Rd, Suite C, Drexel Hill, PA 19026, (610)-853-913 l,
casemate@casematepublishing.com.
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totalitarianism, and the role of Swiss newsreels in building the spirit of
resistance.
The second unit, Preparing for Invasion, concerns military preparations.
Swiss soldiers recall an epoch when every day could have been "the day"
when all hell would break loose and they would meet the enemy. Blitzkrieg
plans against Switzerland devised by the German Wehrmacht in 1940 are
described in detail. Switzerland was an armed camp with countless
fortifications, against which the Axis could have attempted access with
extreme costs in blood. In Switzerland, Jews - like all other citizens were in arms, and Jewish officers served in the highest levels of the Swiss
army.
Struggle for Survival: Food, Fuel and Fear , the third unit, presents oral
histories of daily life during the war with its shortages, alarms, and rumors.
Jokes and slurs the Swiss devised to characterize the "Nazi pigs" are told.
Daily life is probed, including the role of women in the military and the
economy. A chapter on the refugee crisis investigates whether Swiss
officials played a role in Germany's adoption of the "J" stamp on Jewish
passports, how Switzerland became a lifeboat for refugees, and how asylum
policies were liberalized as the persecution of Jews escalated.
Espionage and Subversion, the fourth and final unit, covers strategic
issues and intelligence activities. German attack plans and bickering in the
Gestapo about who would rule a conquered Switzerland persisted. One
chapter focuses on Davos, where the Swiss struggled against a Fifth Column
and which became a safe haven for American airmen whose crippled
bombers made it to Swiss territory. The last chapter profiles Switzerland as
America ' s window on the Reich - how Allen Dulles and his OSS spied on
the Nazis, at times with help from Swiss Intelligence.
The book was reviewed by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, under the title "A
Memorial for the Active Service Generation: American Praise for
Switzerland in the Second World War." 3 The review notes:
"Halbrook makes a devastating appraisal of the Bergier Report: None of
the significant topics it discusses are properly treated in the 25 volumes of
the Swiss Historical Commission; the one-sided report concentrates on the
economic relations of Switzerland with Nazi Germany, which was
inevitable for the surrounded country to survive, and eludes a
comprehensive, systematic analysis. Above all, Halbrook criticizes the
Commission for failing to interview eye witnesses, to the extent it was still
possible. It thus rejected the opportunity to make use of the method of 'Oral
History.' Halbrook availed himself of this method extensively and comes ..
. to the conclusion that the Swiss of the active service generation, who were
ready to sacrifice their lives against an invasion of Nazi Germany,
represented the country's 'Greatest Generation."'
3

"Ein Denkmal for die Aktivdienstgeneration: Amerikanische s Lob filr die Schweiz im
Zweiten
Weltkrieg,
" N e u e Zurch e r Z e itun g,
24 . Juni
2006,
http://www.nzz .ch/2006/06/24/pl/articleE6PVB.html.
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Chapter 1. Eyes of German Intelligence.
Today, at the German military archives in Freiburg im Breisgau, one
may examine a large box filled with numerous local maps showing
fortifications and compiled by "Nachrichtendienst le: Schweiz" (Intelligence
Service le [Army Group CJ: Switzerland), and dated August 18 through
December 28, 1939.
Included are tourist maps, official maps, topographical maps and
military maps of all kinds. Intelligence agents drew in pen the positions of
machine gun nests, bunkers, munitions storage, and every other known
defensive shelter. To gather this intelligence, German spies and informants
were obviously present in every village, town, and city. The only reason to
gather detailed intelligence of this kind was to prepare for an attack. Swiss
authorities, aware of this activity, forbade the sale of maps.
The German Intelligence reports provide a comprehensive picture of
what the Swiss thought of the Third Reich. A remarkably candid assessment
was distributed by the OKW dated November 17, 1939.4 The following are
some excerpts:
"[T]he Swiss population is very hostile towards Germany .... 90% of
the population has a negative attitude towards Germany, 5% are indifferent,
and at best 5% have a positive attitude ....
Reich German citizens are
reportedly called bad names such as 'Sauschwob' [Swabian pig] and
'Nazihund' [Nazi dog], and German business people are threatened with
boycotts. In the recent past, a number of such upright Germans have been
expelled from the country ....
Jewish emigrants in their blind hatred are
inciting people against anything German and, of course, they are not open to
objective arguments. The reports point to Zurich [Jews] as the center for
intelligence.
"We have learned that the Federal Council is striving to impose
neutrality on the press ... Reportedly, the press showed a certain reluctant
restraint after that, but the tone towards Germany was still spiteful and
nasty .... Given the population's attitude, German propaganda is showing
little effect. According to the reports, the Swiss simply do not believe the
Germans anymore and even think that the German radio is lying.
"[T]he Swiss military routinely refers to the Fuhrer using the most
obscene terms .... Reports show that Poland enjoys great sympathy all over
Switzerland .... France and England are said to be appreciated because the
Swiss reportedly assume that Switzerland will retain its current size if the
Western forces win, while they fear that the German-speaking part of
Switzerland will be annexed by Germany if Germany wins .... " The report
ends as follows:
France is loved,
Frankreich wird geliebt,
England is admired,
England bewundert,
Germany is hated.
Deutschland gehasst.
4

Bundesarchiv/Militarchiv ("BNMA") RW 5/357.
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Chapter 2. Hanging Hitler in Satire
This chapter examines the two leading sources of satire in Switzerland
which - in the face of shrill German diatribes - lampooned and infuriated
the Nazis. One was the Nebelspalter, Switzerland's leading magazine of
humor and political cartoons since 1875. It took no prisoners, publishing
hugely popular caricatures of the national socialisms of both Germany and
Russia. Cabaret Cornichon was the other. Its writers and actors kept
audiences in stitches with rollicking live performances which openly
mocked the pretensions of the Third Reich, even in the darkest days.
Nebelspalter, September 1939: Nazi Germany and Communist Russia
had just attacked and partitioned Poland. The picture shows a gruesome
Nazi hugging an equally gruesome Communist. Both are laughing and
dripping with blood. The caption: "The New Friends. 'We now have to wipe
off the dirt we threw at each other for so long! "' 5
August 1940: Western Europe has fallen to the German blitzkrieg.
Switzerland is surrounded but armed and determined. In this cartoon, a
short, fat Swiss man, his dog at his feet, folds his hands before a sharp Nazi
face. The main caption: "If need be, pretend to be deaf!" The sub caption is
a little lesson on "playing dumb" and thwarting the Nazis:
"Isn't it true, every man possesses his own rifle?" "No no, my dog
is called Mopsli not Trifle." "Don't you keep your rifle ready all the
time?" "Unfortunately, Mopsli eats more than he can handle at one
time." "Will you please listen: a heavy rifle and rounds of
ammunition?" "Well, this is true, for Mopsli food is always a
temptation." "As far as I know, you also maintain an Ortswehr
(local guard)?" "I agree, Mopsli is too fat by far."
May 1945: With the Axis finally defeated, Nebelspalter could lambaste
with no holds barred. One cartoon is captioned, "The very last reunion." The
deceased Hitler and Mussolini, with black wings, ascend over ruins of cities
and piles of corpses.
The Cabaret Cornichon became so popular that the Zurich police feared
that its shows might provoke the Germans to take measures to punish all of
Switzerland ....
On May 25, 1939, the police reported that the German
Consulate General in Zurich had complained about the performance, which
by that time had rocked the city with its defamatory satire. The report
explained:

5

Gegen Rote und Braune Fauste: Das Weltgeschehen van 1932-1948 in 342 Karikaturen
aus dem Nebelspalter (Nebelspalter-Verlag Rorschach, 1949).
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In "The Rat Catcher," an announcer opens by telling Swiss children
that Switzerland has become a part of the Third Reich. The Rat
Catcher then enters and uses his flute to hypnotize the children to
determine how they react to the Anschluss. Then actress Voli Geiler
comes on the stage. She declares that her mother, a very fashionable
French-speaking Swiss, had strongly favored the Anschluss. But
now, she laments, all her jewelry has been stolen. Her broches
[brooches] and all her money went to the "boches" [slang for
Germans]. This entire sketch is directly anti-German ... and the
applause of the audience shows that it has had its intended effect. 6
The Zurich police duly admonished the Cornichon and author Walter
Lesch, that it was "not nice" to insult foreign peoples. Lesch didn't give an
inch. He held his ground and refused to strike anything from the scene.
A performance in May of 1942 drove the Nazis mad. Two actors are
standing in front of the curtain. One of them is selling the Nazi newspaper,
the Signal. The other, a passer-by, notices that a picture is printed on the
paper. He shouts "Is that him?" - meaning Adolf Hitler. "Yes, that is
him"- "I want to cut out this picture and frame it!" - "What, do you want
to hang it on the wall at home?" - "I do not know yet - either I will hang
it or put it on the wall [for execution]." The audience roared, but in most of
Europe at that time jokes about killing Hitler would have gotten the
humorist hung or put up against the wall to be shot.
Chapter 3. Counterattack of the Newsreels

The author interviewed Paul Alexis Ladame, the head of the Swiss
Wochenschau (Weekly News) during 1940-44, and received comments on
this chapter by Hans Laemmel, who headed it during 1944-61.
"National Defense and the Ortswehren (Local Forces)" is the title that
flashes across the screen in movie theaters in Switzerland in August 1943. A
dramatic voiceover intones: "May 1940: Attack on Belgium and Holland;
breakthrough of Panzer forces far into the hinterland. Paratroopers,
saboteurs, evacuation of the civil population .... call of the General for the
formation of the Ortswehren (Local Defenses)." 7
An alarm signal sounds and a ready unit of Ortswehr men grab their
rifles and run out, secreting themselves along a barricaded road with
Molotov cocktails or other explosive devices at the ready; an enemy vehicle
appears; the devices are lit and several are hurled at the vehicle; the vehicle
explodes; nightfall comes with the sound of heavy weapons fire;
camouflaged Ortswehr members hide in the deepening shadows; finally
larger units of the Swiss army are shown moving into position.
6
7

Elsie Attenhofer , Cornichon: Erinnerungen an ein Cabaret (Benteli Verlag Bern, 1975).
La,ndesverteidigung und Ortswehren, August 1943, Armeefilmdienst.
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Swiss Major Roland Ziegler noted about the German newsreels: "The
purpose was to prove to the Swiss that the German Wehrmacht could not be
stopped from crushing every enemy and the Swiss were still under a kind of
idyllic Seldwyla illusion regarding their defense readiness." (Seldwyla is an
imaginary Swiss town in a novel by nineteenth-century Swiss author
Gottfried Keller.) Ziegler explained:
"While the newsreels intended for Germany showed infantry battles at
length, they were almost completely missing on the German newsreels
destined for Switzerland. On the other hand, the Swiss were shown in detail
what they did not have. For example, the newsreels would show the
following potpourri: (i) huge bombers bombarding cities and train stations
followed by the Zibelemarit [November onion festival] in Bern, followed by
attacks by large tanks, (ii) submarines in attack mode followed by the
Knabenschiessen [annual boys' shooting match] in Zurich followed by dive
bombers ....
The purpose was clear: Swiss moviegoers should leave the
theater with the impression that nothing could be done against the German
army and all the Swiss were doing was play." 8
The American magazine Fortune reported in 1941 while the U.S. was
still neutral:
There are 360 movie houses in Switzerland .... The movie houses
show both American and German newsreels. The Nazi reels move
with a peculiar jerkiness, a result of the removal of all "Heiting" for
the Swiss market. The Germans are still puzzled, but found that
Swiss audiences laughed uproariously at every sight of a grim-faced
German shooting up his hand like a railroad signal and grunting
"Heil, Hitler!" One theatre had to stop the film to restore calm after
a scene in which Hitler himself had said "Heil, Hitler!" 9
A soccer match between Switzerland and Germany in Zurich depicted
in film in April 1941 had obvious symbolic value. Crowds swamp the
stadium and citizens anxiously listen on the radio; the German players line
up and give the Heil Hitler salute as a band plays; the members of the Swiss
team coolly keep both arms down at their sides; the game is filled with
exciting plays; the crowd is ecstatic as Switzerland wins 2 to 1. 10
Colonel Oscar Frey wrote to the Adjutant General in May 1941 that the
Swiss films must confront the German film initiatives directly and as
quickly as possible. "Example: The German newsreel shows a tank attack.
Answer: Swiss Ik. [lnfanteriekanone - infantry antitank cannon] exercises,
going into position, shooting. Final picture: a shot-through tank armor." 11
8

Major Roland Ziegler, Geschichte der Sektion Heer und Haus 1939-1945 (AHQ Bern
1945), 47.
9
"Switzerland Sits Tight," Fortune (Sept. 1941), vol. 24, pages 74, 112.
1
°
Fussballmatch: Schweiz-Deutschland, April 1941, Schweizer Filmwochenschau.
11
Ziegler, Geschichte der Sektion Heer und Haus, 50.
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Chapter 4. I Was a Militia Soldier Then
The reminiscences of Swiss who actually lived through the period of the
Third Reich provide a rich source of information on life in those dark days,
particularly concerning resistance to the Fifth Column within Switzerland
and the ever-present and real threat of a German invasion.
Listening to persons who actually experienced and survived a given
historical epoch presents a unique opportunity to understand how people
really felt. Yet the "Independent Commission of Experts" recently managed
to publish 25 volumes on Switzerland during the period when Nazism ruled
in Germany without bothering to interview a single Swiss citizen who
actually lived during the war to present his or her experiences. 12 Many
Swiss of the wartime generation regard the negative picture painted therein
as the product of young leftist intellectuals with a contemporary agenda who
- through ignorance or intention - distorted the realities of that period.
This chapter is a step to allow some survivors of that epoch to relate
some of their own experiences in their own words.
Hans Kafer grimaced as he turned the subject to the enemies at home.
"There were a dozen Fifth Columnists in town. They planned to set up a
prison camp in Tigerfelden [for Swiss]. Their Gauleiter (head of a Nazi
administrative unit) was named. In 1944, the Ortswehr commander gave me,
a boy of 15, a list of five names, including a German named Disch. The
commander ordered: 'Take two names of the five. If I or my troops give the
order, arrest your two and bring them to the commander of the Ortswehr or
the battalion.' I asked, 'What if they start shooting?' He replied, 'You shoot
first!"'
Max Salm, born in 1922, recalls: "In 1940 young and old civilians were
encouraged to join the Ortswehr (Local Defense). I was in the second year
at college in Aarau, and our entire class decided to join. We all had been in
the pre-military shooting courses from age 15. We were issued old Model
1889 rifles and a red armband with the white cross to wear on the left arm,
to identify us as members of the armed forces. Our instructions were that we
should always be alert for parachutists and for people behaving
suspiciously. We wanted to shoot as many 'Sauschwaben' (German pigs) as
possible.
"We were encouraged to take our rifles and armbands everywhere,
including to college. Since it was tiring to carry a heavy rifle, we were
allowed to carry a revolver or pistol instead. I did not own such a weapon,
so my uncle gave me his Browning 6.5 mm pistol, which I still have in a
cupboard today."
Werner P. Auer was born in 1921. "I was in the army from September
1941 through the end of the war and later, in all 2,500 days of service. At
12

The Commission publications are described in http://www.uek.ch/en/index.htm. The final
report in English is Independent Commission of Experts, Switzerland, National Socialism
and the Second World War: Final Report (Zurich: Pendo Verlag, 2002).
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the borders with France and Italy, the Germans had fences with bells. The
Swiss would ring the bells as a prank and the Germans would come running.
"In the army we discussed German preparations. We did not distinguish
the Germans and the Nazis - they were the same enemy. I never met anyone
who would consider abandoning Switzerland. Passive cooperation was
excluded. People would have disappeared into the woods and waged
guerrilla warfare. The Reduit decision was not opposed and did not lead to
discouragement. People never complained that they would be abandoned."
Felix P. Bentz found himself rushing across town on his bike,
"delivering instructions and materials to blacked-out office buildings and
hospitals. Preparations to minimize the effects of air attacks were high on
the list for everybody. I was made a block warden in our street, which meant
that, after just a few hours of instructions, I would be empowered to check
on the air defense preparations of our neighbors.
"One of the key requirements was to clear all of the accumulated junk
and clutter from the typically vast attics. The only items that were required
up there were a shovel and a box of sand, which, in theory, would be used to
extinguish fires caused by incendiary bombs. Durin.g one of my lectures a
lady asked me how one could be so sure that such a bomb would fall into
the box?"
Resistance to a Nazi invasion and potential occupation was a topic of
constant discussion among the Swiss armed forces. Ambassador Heinz
Langenbacher remembers it well. "As young air force lieutenants, we often
discussed - sometimes all night - what we would have to do if the
Germans attacked and invaded Switzerland. We agreed that we would not
flee abroad, but go underground to organize a resistance movement. Our
models were the Finns whose fight for independence we admired and the
French Maquis of whose successful operations against the Germans we kept
getting breathless reports across the border."
"We discussed how we would form resistance cells in the mountains, set
up resistance groups at universities, conduct covert operations with farmers,
and obtain weapons caches from army supplies. We also agreed that we
would have to do everything possible to convince our fellow citizens that
flight would weaken the spirit of the people. We had learned in particular
from the French that mothers and daughters were playing an important role
in the resistance movement. We therefore agreed that the women would
have to be integrated into our movement from the beginning."
Karl Elsener, Sr., who was born in 1922, would inherit the family
business Victorinox. "In 1941, instructions from Bern directed that plans be
made to destroy all machines to render them unusable if the Germans
invaded. The plan was to remove important pieces of the machines - parts
that could be taken quickly - and to hide them in the mountains. This was
part of our psychological war: Germans must know that our factories will
not fall to them, and there will be few fruits of an invasion. The Swiss did

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol43/iss1/2

8

Halbrook: The Swiss And The Nazis

Review

12

[February

not need to publicize this, for the German spies knew the Swiss would resist
and would sabotage their own factories."

Chapter 5. Blitzkrieg 1940
Denmark and Norway fell, and then the blitzkrieg was unleashed on
Belgium, Holland, and France. On May 17, 1940, the Abwehr - the
intelligence service of the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW,
Armed Forces High Command) reported about Switzerland:
The entire population is against us; there is no doubt about that.
Condemnation has become even stronger since the recent events in
the north. The Swiss press has a hard time maintaining even a front
of objective neutrality. Anyone who reads between the lines sees
immediately that the hearts of the Swiss are on the other side. 13
As Holland fell, German intelligence gave this account of attitudes and
activities in Switzerland:
We have reports that the Swiss government has ordered the arming
of the civilian population and the drafting of those not fit for
military service into an auxiliary. In Basel, barricades and bunkers
have been set up everywhere. Requests for leave are being denied.
There is fear that Germans will loot Swiss banks, and it is reBorted
that banks have taken measures to move and safeguard assets. 4
The Swiss were still on high alert , as trip-wire incursions continued.
The Swiss command reported: "On Saturday afternoon foreign airplanes
entered Swiss territory in the Jura area. A Swiss air patrol immediately
pursued and engaged them, shooting down a bomber in the vicinity of
Tessenberg (Canton Bern). The bomber was German. " 15 The fact that the
bomber was German appears almost as an afterthought. In other words,
neutrality first, specific nationality second.
But this insult to the all-powerful Luftwaffe enraged Hitler. He despised
the Swiss and ordered immediate retaliation, curiously in the form of a
clandestine raid, rather than a full-fledged military assault. A June 3
directive stated: "At the request of Field Marshall Goring, Abwehr II
(Military Intelligence) has been ordered to attack Swiss fighter ai~lanes on
Swiss airfields . . .. L.2 is in charge of executing this order." 16 The raid
failed. Swiss authorities managed to apprehend the German saboteurs, who
13
BA/MA RW 4/313 , Oberkommando der Wehrmacht , An Auswartiges Amt.
(lnformationsabteilung) , 17.5.1940.
14
BAIMA RW 4/313 , Auslandsbriefpriifstelle, Stimmungsbericht Nr. 10, 27.5.1940 .
15
BA/MA RWS/359, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Kurze Fassung, 2.6.1940.
16
BAIMA RWS/497 , Abschrift [?].1940.
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were laden with explosives and carried plans to demolish Swiss fighter
bases.
Wehrmacht units racing through France came upon a trainload of secret
documents inadvertently abandoned by the French on a siding at La Charite
near Dijon. Those documents , quickly processed by the Germans, were a
Realpolitik bombshell. They detailed Swiss-French agreements for joint
military resistance - in blatant violation of Swiss neutrality! Moreover,
Swiss defensive plans were laid out in detail for the German high command.
While the Germans were digesting this new information, Wehrmacht
units, particularly Guderian's Panzers, were pushing demoralized French
and Polish units towards the Swiss border. On June 18 a report to the
German General Staff of a meeting in Versailles noted: " 12th Army
[German] at Swiss border. It is necessary for this army to assemble [to
prepare for a move again st Switzerland] soon." 17
Swiss intelligence obtained information that on June 24, the day France
capitulated, Hitler discussed Switzerland with Goring, Keitel , Ribbentrop,
Hess and Goebbels. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop favored an immediate
occupation of Switzerland , while General Keitel was of the opinion that
German goals could be reached through the mere threat of a massive
buildup , "without risking the sacrifice of some hundred thousand German
soldiers. " 18
On June 25, the effective date of the armi stice with France , a detailed
invasion plan was submitted by Captain Otto Wilhelm von Menges of the
German General Staff to the Army High Command, the Oberkommodo des
Heere s (OKH). It was entitled "Vortragsnoti z iiber Angri(f gegen die
Schwei z" (Presentation Notes for Attack Against Switzerland). It laid out a
surprise attack on Switzerland by Wehrmacht troops from both Germany
and France supported by Italian troops from the south.
Captain von Menge s was informed on July 13 about the revelations of
the La Charite document s establishing that Switzerland had been
coordinating its defense with the French. That communication further noted:
"There will be a meeting at the quarters of the Fuhrer where the issue in
question will be discussed. " 20
In early August, fresh, more detailed plans to attack Switzerland were
prepared once again by the same Captain von Menges who did the planning
in July. He made a first draft dated August 8 and a final version dated
17

BA/MA RH 19 III/1 28 (microfi che) Grundle gende Befehle und Wei sungen, 29 .6.12. 10. J940 , Geheime Komrnando sache, Chef des General stabes des Heer es, Besprechun g
in Ver saille s am 18.6.40 , 29 .6. I 940.
18
Klau s Urner , "Die Schweiz muss noch gesc hluckt werden! " 62-63 ; Halbrook , Targe t
Switzerland , 117.
19
BA/MA RH 2/465 , Vortrag snotiz iiber Angriff gegen die Schweiz , 25.6.1940. See Urner ,
"Die Schweiz muss noch gesc hluckt werden! " 52-55, 151-54; Halbrook , Targe t Switzerland ,
118.
20
BA/MA RHJ 9 III/129 , Ober st i.G.Miiller von Hptm.i.G . von Menge s, Op. Abt. , 13.7.40 .

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol43/iss1/2

10

Halbrook: The Swiss And The Nazis

14

Review

[February

August 12. The plans were divided into two parts: "Der Deutsche Angriff
Gegen die Schweiz" (the German attack against Switzerland) and "Der
ltalienische Angriff' (the Italian attack).2 1 The plans included detailed ma~s
showing attacks by infantry, border, motorized and panzer divisions. 2
While predicting a quick victory, Menges warned: "The individual soldier is
a tough fighter and a good sharpshooter."
On August 26, General Franz Halder of the OKH High Command
ordered preparation of a revised invasion plan to be executed by Army
Group C. He knew that "Switzerland is determined to resist any invasion by
exerting all her strength." There had clearly been discussion between Hitler
and Mussolini. Halder wrote: "Italy demands the Swiss territory south of the
Bernese and Glarus Alps as being in its sphere of interest. Italy is ready to
invade this territory if German forces march into northern Switzerland at the
same time." 223
Hitler typically instructed different operations branches to plan different
tasks without informing the branches of competing assignments. At least
two plans were prepared in this period quite independently of each other.
The first would have utilized Army Group C, while the second utilized the
German First Army.
The first plan was Operationsentwurf Schweiz - Tannenbaum (Draft
Operations Plan Switzerland - Christmas Tree.) It was submitted for
consideration by General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb of Army Group C on
October 4 in response to the August 26 directive from General Halder of the
General Staff's Operations Section. 224
Hitler had made the fateful decision to attack Russia in the spring. This
may have been part of the reason the whole Tannenbaum operation was
cancelled abruptly on November 11, 1940, by a telephone call by Captain
Worgtzky of the General Staff: "The Operations Division is reporting to the
Army Group that plan 'Tannenbaum' is no longer relevant because it has
been overtaken by events." This was relayed to the head of the General
Staff. 25
A second invasion plan, independent of Tannenbaum, was presented on
the same date as the original Tannenbaum, October 4. General Staff Major
Bobo Zimmermann submitted a detailed battle plan to Armeeoberkommando
I (OAK 1, the High Command of the First Army) entitled "Studie iiber
einen Aufmarsch gegen die Schweiz aus dem Raume der I. Armee" (Stud~
Over a Deployment Against Switzerland from the Zone of the First Army). 6
BAIMA RH 2/465.
BAIMA RH 2/465, K-2, Krafteansatz, 2097/482; K-3; K-13 through 19.
23
BAIMA RH 2/465, Fiche 3, Row 3, Geheime Kommandosache, OKH, 26.8.1940.
24
BA/MA RH 2/465, Fiche 3, Row 3, Heeresgruppenkommando
C, Betr.:
Operationsentwurf Schweiz ("Tannenbaum"), 4.10.1940.
25
BA/MA RH 19 IV/3 (MF), Anruf Hptm.Worgitzky11.11.40
Tannenbaum.
26
BA/MA RH 20-1/368, Nr. 00 I, Rows 2-3, Armeeoberkommando 1; Studie iiber einen
Aufmarsch gegen die Schweiz aus dem Raume der 1. Armee, 4.10.1940.
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It warned emphatically: "No operation into the Alps!" Zimmermann wrote:
"The Swiss army has fighting power and spirit, especially in that they are
defending their own country. The army makes good use of terrain and is
very skilled in guerrilla warfare. Swiss soldiers have considerable technical
skills. We would therefore run into tough resistance .... "
Despite the danger, German agents continued to report that the Swiss
favored the Allies. "Propaganda against the Reich" was the subject of an
OKW analysis which explained Swiss "neutrality" as follows:
We have reports that a brigade commander of the Swiss army made
the following statement to his officers: "It is our task to remain
steadfast and firm as a rock. We must hope that England will do the
same. Then Nazi Germany will certainly be defeated. You must
meet any defeatism with vigor. You must make it clear to our
officers and troops that the Swiss army can absolutely hold its
ground against the German army. Only dive-bombers and tanks of
the German army are highly developed and both are instruments of
27
combat which are useless in the high Alps."

Chapter 6. Switzerland Is a Porcupine
The defenses of the Limmat Line around the city of Baden exemplify
the Swiss defenses before the fall of France in 1940, when a Wehrmacht
attack was still expected to come from Germany. This author was shown the
remaining fortifications by Dr. Walter Ltiem, the leading expert on the
subject today. 28 The Divisionar (Major General) of the 8th Mountain
Division had prevailed on General Guisan to position the defenses on the
south side of the Limmat, where steep banks rise up against a precipitous
mountainside. The Germans would have had to cross the river and face
murderous fire from artillery, machine guns, and rifles hidden throughout
those commanding heights.
Swiss strategy for a Nazi attack in the vicinity of Baden took advantage
of natural bottlenecks through which German forces would be forced to
proceed. Three rivers converge there - the Aare, the Limmat, and the
Ruess, each carving its way through impassible mountain terrain, leaving
the roads in the narrow valleys as the only passage for an army. At the end
of the bottleneck is Reuenthal, which was heavily fortified with
camouflaged cannon emplacements, extensive underground tunnels and
quarters, and antitank and machinegun nests.

27

BA/MA RW 5/358, OKW, Laufende Informationen Nr. 66, 29.10.1940.
Interview and tour with Dr. Walter Lliem, June 7, 1999, Baden. See Walter Lliem and
Andreas Steigmeier, Die Limmatstellung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Baden: Baden-Verlag, 1997)
and tour guide , Fuhrer zur Limmatstellund aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Baden: BadenVerlag, 1997).

28

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol43/iss1/2

12

Halbrook: The Swiss And The Nazis

16

Review

[February

The major fortifications - Sargans, Gotthard and St. Maurice protected the main valleys extending into the Alpine Reduit. Its northern
entrances were defended in the gaps where the Plateau gives way to the
Alps. One such strong point was the Fortress Fiirigen, located on a lake near
Lucerne. It is open to visitors today and, then as now, from the outside one
sees nothing but rocky, vertical bluffs. The fortress is completely
camouflaged and hidden from view.
One entrance appears to be rock but is actually plaster on screen wire
over a heavy metal door. There is a cannon just inside the door, and a sign:
"Warning! Before you shoot, open the camouflage door!" One can only
imagine the dismay of any Swiss artilleryman who forgot.
Colonel Alexandre Morisod, Commandant of the Fortifications Corps at
St. Maurice-Lavey, guided this author on a tour of the St. Maurice
stronghold, a tour which would have been a top-secret briefing until
recently. Ascending the mountains, one is immediately struck by
breathtaking Alpine scenery and, if lucky, by the sighting of a Chamois.
You can make out observation points way up on the tops of mountains
which served to identify targets and direct artillery fire.
Camouflaged doors conceal entrances into the fortifications. Once
inside, there is a vast underground maze of tunnels leading to gun positions,
communications facilities, mess halls and sleeping quarters. Underground
funiculars carried men and supplies. There are whole rooms filled with
power and ventilation equipment, and every other facility necessary for this
town within the mountain. Stretches of hallways of hollowed out stone are
broken at intervals by enormous steel doors and other interior defenses
designed to thwart enemy intrusion. Cannon from 5.3 cm to 12 cm bores
were able suddenly to appear from and immediately disappear back into the
mountain positions. From the highest point, one can shoot all the way to the
Lake of Geneva or to the French border.
An essential component of the protection of Switzerland was the
issuance of a rifle to every Swiss male - Jewish and non-Jewish alike - and
service in the militia army. After the Nazis conquered most of Western
Europe in 1940, if not before, Switzerland had the highest concentration of
Jews in arms in Europe.
A tiny group of Swiss known as "Frontists" supported Nazism. In
October 1940, Frontist leader Robert Tobler in a speech and a pamphlet
attacked the Swiss Jews as against the military and demanded that they be
expelled from the Swiss militia army. Saly Mayer, president of the
Federation of Swiss Jewish Communities (Schweizerischer /sraelitischer
Gemeindebund or SIG), wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Isidor Nordmann
emphasizing that Swiss Jews served in the military with enthusiasm. A coJ?y
of the letter went to General Guisan, with whom Nordmann was friendly. 2
29

Zsolt Keller, "'L'armee est en dehors de toutes questions de confession!' Ji.idische
Soldaten und Offiziere in der Schweizer Armee 1933-1945," Bulletin der Schwei zerschen
Gesellschaftfar Judaishsche Forschung, Nr. 11 (2002), 17, 22-23.
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General Guisan replied firmly: "L 'armee est en de hors de tout es
questions de confession!" ("The army is outside of all questions of
religion!") In the military forces, Swiss Jews were no different than Swiss
Protestants or Catholics.
The late Robert Simon Braunschweig, a prominent military figure who
would become head of the Federation of Swiss Jewish Communities, was
born in 1914. He told this author in a 1999 interview: "At the second
mobilization (the invasion of France in May and June of 1940), we thought
the Germans would attack. Motor officers were scarce, and I was reassigned
to the 4th Division in Baden, an old communications hub on the Limmat
river. My motorized light gun company was to survey the north bank of the
Rhine river where German tanks had been spotted. We anticipated that they
were poised to attack us, but in fact they were preparing to attack the French
Maginot Line.
"France fell, leaving Switzerland with an open and not very defensible
flank. I had a conversation with one of my commanding officers, asking
him: 'What will you do with your Jewish lieutenant?' He answered: 'The
two of us will die together.' We both had heard the German song with the
words, 'When we go back [from France] through Switzerland .... '
"The day France fell, a few Swiss officers and soldiers disappeared and
were never seen again. They were pro-Nazi. Were they killed by Swiss?"
Braunschweig did not elaborate further on this intriguing suggestion, which
is not mentioned in the historical literature.
Korpskommandant (Lieutenant General) Herbert Constam was the
highest-ranking Jewish officer in the Swiss army (and perhaps at that time in
any army). His grandfather, Joseph Kohnstamm, had emigrated to America
and fought in the American Civil War. Herbert's father, Emil Joseph
Constam, was born in New York in 1858, but returned to Switzerland and
became a professor at a Swiss technical high school. Herbert first practiced
law in Zurich, then entered the army, rising through the ranks to colonel and
serving as the Commander of the Walenstadt Shooting School from 1934 to
1937. He then was named Commander of the 6th Division (1938-1943) and
afterwards Commander of Mountain Army Corps 3 (1944-1950). His 1944
wartime promotion made Constam one of on~ four corps commanders, the
highest rank next to the Commander-in-Chief. 0
Considered by Commander-in-Chief Guisan to be his best corps
commander, Constam was notorious for insisting on the very best shooting
skills. If a soldier did not shoot well, Constam would stand between two
targets and order the shooting to continue. 31
General Guisan put Constam in charge of anti-tank strategy. His
recommendations, based in part on the lessons of El Alamein, were to

°

3

Constam, Lebenslauf (private pnntmg , Benoit de Montmollin -Constam, CH 2533
Evilard); Ernst Wetter and Eduard v. Orelli , Wer ist wer im Militiir ? (1986), 37.
31
Interview with Paul Rothenhau sler, Stafa-Ziirich , June 6, 1999.
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integrate special grenadier forces into the infantry .32 In the spring of 1943
Guisan ordered Constam' s plan to be implemented.
An intelligence report of the German Army's General Staff entitled
Kleines Orientierungsheft Schweiz (Concise Reference Work Switzerland),
which was issued in September 1942 and revised in December 1944,
included an analysis of the top 34 members of the Swiss military
leadership. 33 It described Guisan as "Intelligent, very cautious. Behind his
overt correctness stands his sympathy with the Western powers." Constam
was described as "Sehr tiichtig. Nicht-Arier. Deutschfeindlich." (Very
capable. Non-Aryan. Enemy of Germany).
Chapter 7. Spirit of Resistance
The earliest memory of Hitler's assumption of power in 1933 by then
eleven-year old Bruno Capol of Windisch is characteristic. Like graffiti
spray-painted on buildings today, "so at the very beginning of Hitler's
takeover we found chalk-cartoons showing a man hanging at the gallows
with a swastika and the following words:"

Hitler soil an' s Seil!
Und es tont an alien Ecke,
Adolf Hitler soil verrecke!

Heil, heil, heil!
Hail, hail, hail!
Hang Hitler on a nail!
Shout it loudly to the sky,
Adolf Hitler's going to die!

At the 1934 federal shooting competition in Frei burg, Peter Voser' s
father was firing when suddenly a "Special Edition" of the newspaper
arrived. "Hindenburg is dead, Hitler is Reichsprasident!" screamed the
headlines. Voser recalls: "The men dropped their pistols, went over to the
tent and discussed the event , saying 'Hitler, this Sau (pig), now he is fully in
power, now there will be war, there will be war .... "'
Verena Rothenhausler lived 10 kilometers from the Rhine, heard alarms
at night, and lived in almost constant fear of hostilities. She was in the
Landsdienst, helped farmers after school and during holidays, and had been
trained by her father to shoot a rifle - which she would do if the Nazis came.
"My mother called a German 'Saunazi' (Nazi pig), a term which could also
apply to a Swiss with Nazi sympathies. We also called Germans
'Sauschwabe.'"
Georges-Andre Chevallaz, who would later become the President of the
Swiss Confederation, recalled: "I was born in 1915. My father was a teacher
at Verdu near Lake Neuchatel at the border with France. Everyone was
against Hitler. A Nazi was called a 'boche.' I had no fear about the Germans
32
33

Willi Gautschi , General Henri Guisan ( 1989), 628.
BAIMA DV-RH/402. Orientierungshefte .
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corning, because I was young and I hated Germany. I remember the April
1940 Order that any surrender announcement must be regarded as enemy
propaganda. This was the policy for the entire war."
The following joke recalled by Gustav and Margot Durrer about a
border exchange told during the Second World War probably had an
equivalent in the 1499 Swabian War:
One morning, at the Swiss-German border, a German soldier
handed over a package to a Swiss soldier. When the package was
opened, it was found to contain a cow cake (Kuh Fladda). The next
morning, at the same border, the Swiss soldier handed over a
beautifully wrapped package, containing a big piece of Swiss
cheese, and a note: "Each country sends its best!"
The Fuhrer himself was well aware of how the Swiss used the
derogatory term "Schwaben." At their June 2, 1941, conference on the
Brenner, Hitler and Mussolini discussed carving up Switzerland. "The
Fuhrer characterized Switzerland as the most despicable and wretched
people and national entity. The Swiss were the mortal enemies of the new
Germany, but ... Die Schwaben am Ende den Krieg doch noch gewinnen
wiirden" [the Swabians would win the war]." 34
A large number of Germans resided in Davos, which offered several
sanatoria for tuberculosis patients. Cornelia Rogger, a teenager at the time,
remembers:
The war was raging in Russia. A 15-year-old German schoolboy
said to me: "We will invade Switzerland and we will take your fur
coat for our army!" I replied: "You murderers. I' 11burn my coat
before I give it to you!" I saw him a few days later at the swimming
pool. He said: "I hope you're not mad at me." I knew he could not
swim, but I pushed him into the pool anyway and ran away.
Someone rescued him. The German consulate telephoned me to
come and answer for my act. I refused.
On April 28, 1945, Mussolini was executed and strung up by his heels
from a lamppost. The news was received by Corps Commander Herbert
Constam, who telephoned his wife and sang out: "Mussolini is dead. Ciao!"
and then hung up. He was saying "so long" both to his wife and to 11Duce,
the latter in a contemptuous manner. This was related to the author by
Cons tam's secretary and phone operator, Frau R. Braunschweig, who
overheard the remark.

34

Andreas Hillgruber, Staatsmi:inner und Diplomaten bei Hitler (Mi.inchen: DTV, 1969),
275-76.
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Chapter 8. Gas Masks and Potato Bread: Oral History

A woman went up to the General and exclaimed, "I must have
them back!"
The General, who had heard this many times, answered: "I
know, you want your husband and son back."
The woman responded: "I want my two horses back!"
Horses were critical for plowing and harvesting crops - especially to the
women who were left to do the farm work - but they were also needed by
the army for pulling artillery and hauling supplies in rugged Alpine terrain.
The Women's
Auxiliary
Service,
known
as the FHD
(Frauenhilfsdienst), was a popular organization formed to assist the Swiss
Armed Forces. Their activities, which ran the gamut from nursing to
watching for aircraft, included services traditionally provided by women as
well as activities meant to free the men for armed service. An FHD
recruiting poster read: "Schweizer Frauen meldet Euch zum FHD. Jede
FHD Macht Einen Soldaten far die Front Frei." (Swiss women, join the
FHD. Every FHD enlistment frees a soldier for the front.)
In a 1999 interview, FHD member Esther Terrier recalled: "I was in Girl
Scouts, and my family was patriotic. My father and brother were called up
in the general mobilization of 1939. I was 18 in December and joined the
FHD Army Hospital administration. Everyone thought that the FHD
represented solidarity and showed you had a positive attitude. We learned to
march and wore Scout uniforms. Those who were not Scouts before the war
wore aprons. Those who were 20 or older wore the Swiss arm band and had
a service book." The armband identified them as members of the Armed
Forces, and the service book recorded their military training and service.
Like male soldiers, FHD members wore IDs called "death tags" Americans like to lighten the topic by calling them dog tags. The tag of one
FHD veteran, which this author examined, reads: "Alice Renold-Asper,
22.12.19 [birth date] Prot[estant], Dattwil AG [address], D [Dienst or
service], Chef [commander]." The tag is oval shaped and can be broken in
the middle - half stays with the dead body; the other goes to the family.
Frau Renold-Asper, whose neck graced that tag, was asked what were
members of the FHD instructed to do if the Germans invaded? Alice
explained: "I learned how to use a pistol. Our order was to stay in place and
keep working unless we received new directives. Some lost their nerve and
needed psychological counseling by clergy. We were attached to troops, so
we would also have become prisoners of war if the Germans came and
captured them. We knew we were not to cooperate. We were prepared for
the worst.
"The FHD served in refugee camps. Hundreds of Italian women and
children would arrive at the same time. Once, instead of the expected 160
women and children, 160 partisans arrived." The Italian partisans were no
doubt escaping from the Nazi occupation forces in northern Italy.
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Gertrud Seiler has a vivid memory of the day the war began in
September 1939: "General mobilization! What an unforgettable day! I was
only 14. When Father got orders to report to the Army, he was in the middle
of a delicate process at the factory. But he dropped everything, dashed home
and immediately packed to leave. We stood around him, deeply depressed
and full of anguish. Father hardly spoke and refused to be seen off by any of
us. I disregarded his wish and tagged along with him for a short distance. I
clung to his hand and felt his fingers tightening around mine. I said more
than a thousand words! His features were tense and twitching as he bent
down to kiss me farewell. The only words he was able to utter were 'Bhilet
Di Gott!' (God bless you.) His blessing accompanied me all my life! He
then went off ... alone. Would we ever see him again? What would become
of our country? How was Mother going to manage with her four children
and with the family business losing most of its male employees? Tears,
anguish and prayers swept through our whole country."
Hedwig Stamm, whom this author interviewed when she was a veryalert 92 years old, worked for Heimat und Lager from the late fall of 1942
until 1948. More precisely, the organization was called Eidgenossische
Zentralleitung der Heimat und Lager/Directionfederale des homes et camps
- Federal Administration for Home and Camp. She acted as the right hand
for Dr. Heinrich Rothmund, Director of the Police Division in the Federal
Department of Justice and Police, administering over 50 "homes" (tourist
hotels) for refugee women and children, the majority of whom were Jewish.
The men stayed in camps nearby. The first to open was the Hotel Bellevue
in Schaffhausen. The network of refugee hotels eventually reached from
northern Switzerland down to Interlaken and west to the Lake of Geneva,
and to the south in Ticino. For military security reasons, hotels in the Reduit
were not used for refugees.
Hedi Koppel Moore told an interesting anecdote that well illustrates the
curious ways of Swiss democracy. In Switzerland the Federal President and
other officials are basically treated like anyone else. Many people would not
even know the name of the President or recognize him on the street. Marcel
Pilet-Golaz was Federal President in 1940 and thereafter became the
Foreign Minister. In 1943, Hedi went to work for the Foreign Office in
Bern. "One evening I was waiting to sign out of the building when PiletGolaz arrived. He swept past the sentry who sternly called him back. He
protested, 'I am Pilet-Golaz!' The sentry said only, 'Anyone can say that!'
Pilet-Golaz was required to sign in. No one knew who he was because he
did not arrive in a limousine with flags-he took the streetcar to work.
Chapter 9. The "J"Stamp, the Lifeboat, and Refugees

The charge is often circulated that in 1938 it was in fact the Swiss who
suggested to German officials that passports of German Jews be stamped
with a "J" so they could be readily identified - and denied access. During
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol43/iss1/2
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the wartime period, the senior bureaucrat who made and enforced
controversial immigration decisions was Heinrich Rothmund, Director of
the Police Division of the Federal Department of Justice and Police
(Eidgenossisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, EJPD). Wartime decisions
in this area were exhaustively reviewed in a 1957 report commissioned by
the Federal Council and authored by Professor Carl Ludwig. 35
On September 2, 1938, Dr. Otto Kocher, German minister in Bern,
asked Rothmund if a general Swiss visa requirement could be waived if
German passport holders who were Jews were identified as such. Rothmund
replied that it was "technically" possible, but made clear "that we could not
follow the course provided by Mr. Kocher." In other words, the Swiss would
never agree to identify "their" Jews.
Despite this apparent rejection of a "J" stamp by the Swiss , Privy
Councilor Roediger of the German Foreign Office informed Swiss Legation
counselor Kappeler that Germany was preparing "to mark German passports
issued to Jews," and would require a similar mark on Swiss passports issued
to Swiss Jews. Kappeler responded that "special identification of the
passports of Swiss Jews was impossible on both practical and constitutional
grounds." Rothmund telephoned Kappeler that any such [passport]
discrimination "against Swiss Jews is out of the question."
The Germans opposed Rothmund's insistence on a general visa
requirement. On September 17, 1938, in Bern, he had a stormy meeting with
Kocher and Hans Globke, the German Legation counselor, who withdrew
the German demand for reciprocity with respect to Swiss Jews but
announced that Germany would unilaterally place a mark on the German
passports of non-Aryans. Rothmund shot back the query of "how other
categories of emigrants would be singled out if the struggle against the
churches should be revived,"
Rothmund then reluctantly journeyed to Berlin to negotiate what would
become the German-Swiss Protocol of September 29, 1938. The German
representatives began with the announcement: "For the execution of its laws
and regulations against those Germans defined by the Ni.irnberg laws as nonAryan, for domestic and foreign purposes, the German government needs an
identity document designating them expressly as such. Domestically an
identity card will be introduced which is compulsory for non-Aryans, and
German consulates abroad will identify non-Aryans on passports."
Regarding the latter, "all passports issued in Germany for traveling abroad
will have on the left top of the first page a special mark for Jews in the form
of a circle with a diameter of 2 centimeters and an inserted 'J."'
Faced with the fait accompli of the "J" stamp on German passports, the
Swiss delegation insisted that Swiss Jews must suffer no discrimination.
Rothmund "emphasized vigorously that an agreement would be
35
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unacceptable if it made a distinction between Swiss Aryans and Swiss nonAryans. He said Switzerland did not make such a distinction and would not
allow it. Rather, it treated Swiss Jews as full citizens. He said that we did
not need anti-Semitism and would prevent it from arising." The 1999
Bergier report, which implies that Swiss policy was anti-Semitic, selectively
ignores this statement and all expressions of like kind.
In 1954, the Swiss periodical Beobachter (Observer) published the
untrue assertion that Rothmund originated the "J" stamp. The author
misidentified German minister Kocher' s above mention on September 2,
1938, of marking the passports of German Jews as being that of Rothmund,
who instead strongly rejected the idea. The uproar from the accusation
prompted the Swiss Parliament to order a full report on refugee policy
during the war. The subsequent report by Professor Carl Ludwig - which
remains the primary source on the subject - provided all of the relevant
documents and established Rothmund's repeated rejection of the "J" stamp.
The Bergier report dramatically claims that 24,398 refugees were
"turned away at the border" and "expelled during the war years." 36
Importantly, this figure reflects not the number of people, but the recorded
number of times that persons, most of them anonymous, attempted access
into Switzerland and were denied. That number is by no means the same as
the total who ultimately were denied entry. Bergier made this blatant
statistical blunder by counting multiple attempts as multiple persons,
thereby greatly inflating the numbers. As recorded in many refugee
accounts, a person might not be successful in entering Switzerland on the
first or second try , but often was granted entry later. A more sophisticated
mathematical study by Prof. Jean-Christian Lambelet estimates the actual
number of persons actually rejected at about 5,000. 37
Yet Switzerland's restrictive decrees about refugees readily made
exceptions for children, families with children, the sick, and the elderly.
Able-bodied adults not automatically granted asylum had better chances of
fending for themselves; many were nonetheless granted entry. Toward the
end of the war, when credible evidence of the Nazi extermination of Jews
became firmly established , all Jews became eligible for automatic entry, and
Swiss officials did their best to rescue foreign Jews.
A 1946 issue of the Atlantic Monthly put it in perspective: "America
might have taken in 1,225 ,000 [Jews], since our population is 35 times that
of Switzerland; actually, we did not take as many as Switzerland." 38
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Chapter 10. Consequences of Encirclement
Switzerland spent the years 1941 through 1945 virtually under siege.
Encircled by the Axis powers, threatened with invasion, and subjected to
constant subversion, the Swiss Confederation endured.
Planning ahead, the Germans expected that the Eastern question would
be resolved quickly. In that likelihood, a new German attack plan against
Switzerland was submitted on July 14, 1941, by a Major Wiest to Colonel
Adolf Heusinjer, Chief of the Operations Division of the German Army
General Staff. 9 Heusinger was a key planner of Operation Barbarossa, the
attack on the Soviet Union, which now was rolling over whole Russian
armies. Wiest entitled the plan "Untemehmen W' (Operation Wartegau).
The gist of the plan was as follows:
Our sea transport planes will be gathered on Lake Constance - if
necessary also on the lakes of Upper Bavaria - and loaded with
troops, in particular light motorized troops. Those planes can then
land - all at the same time - on the numerous lakes which form
an almost connected string of waterways bordering the middle
section of Switzerland. Such a water landing will be a complete
surprise to the enemy.
Heu singer had other fish to fry. The Russian advances were staggering
and a logistical nightmare. In the short run, Switzerland had little to
contribute and no Lebensraum. So he was willing to let the little country
continue as a Wartegau (waiting to be a Nazi Gau) a little longer.
In September 1942, the Division for Foreign Armies in the West of the
German Army's General Staff put together a Kleine Orientierungsheft
Schweiz (Orientation Booklet about Switzerland). It included a brief
exposition of the Swiss Army's fighting qualities:
Under the Swiss militia system, all men fit for duty are registered at
relatively low cost. This militia system maintains the martial spirit
of the Swiss people and establishes an army that, for such a small
country, is strong, well organized, and quickly mobilized.
Swiss soldiers love their country and are hardy and tough. They are
excellent marksmen and take good care of their weapons,
equipment, uniforms, horses and pack animals. In particular Swiss
Germans and soldiers from the Alps are reputed to be good
fighters. 40

39
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Despite this warning that any attempt to occupy Switzerland would be
fiercely resisted and costly, Gestapo chief and SS Reichsfiihrer Heinrich
Himmler was making detailed plans for the occupation of Switzerland. He
even named specific Nazis he intended to govern there. SS Gruppenfahrer
(Major General) Gottlob Berger was in the SS hierarchy directly under and
reported to Himmler. Himmler named Berger to head the Schweizer Referat
(Swiss Project). Berger wrote to Himmler on September 8, 1941 concernin,fl
who might become Reich Commissar of a Nazi-occupied Switzerland.
Nazi officials were already fighting among themselves over who would
become the Nazi leader of conquered Switzerland.
Swiss intelligence on their part had a source in the German high
command known as the "Wiking Line." On March 19, 1943, the Swiss
learned from this informant that the Germans, anticipating an Allied attack
in Italy, were once more planning to invade Switzerland. The Swiss believed
that mountain troops were concentrating in Bavaria. The definitive account
of this episode, which became known as the Marz-Alarm (March Alarm), is
set forth in a book by Pierre Braunschweig. 42
The German general staff feared that Italy would capitulate. It is likely
that several invasion plans were formulated during this period. The on~
surviving plan was authored in late 1943 by SS General Hermann Bohme. 3
Bohme's attack was targeted for the late summer of 1944, preferably in
August. But any preparations were abruptly halted with the Allied invasion
of Normandy in June 1944.
After the war ended, the Swiss government prepared a report detailing
known Nazi subversive activities against Switzerland. The report was
introduced as an exhibit by the Allies in the Ntirnberg war crimes trials. 44
The Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes of the U.S. Army described
its import as follows: "Report by the Swiss Federal Council to the Swiss
National Assembly on anti-democratic activities during the war years has it
that SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger knew of a plan, advanced by the SS
Main Office, aiming at extending Nazi rule over Switzerland." The report
was categorized under "SS" entities and "Preparation for Aggressive War,"
and noted:
Particular reference is made to a document contained in Swiss files,
bearing the letter heading "The Reichsfiihrer SS, SS Hauptamt,
Aktion S," in which a detailed plan is set forth for the realization of
the German intention to establish Nazi rule in Switzerland.
41

U.S. National Archives, Tl 75, roll 123, frame 2648463.
Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht Nach Berlin, 259-94 ( 1989).
43
Ernst Uhlmann, "Angriffsplane gegen die Schweiz, " Allgemeine Schwei zerische
Militiir zeitung (Dec. 1949), LX, 841-49.
44
U.S. National Archives , Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes , APO 696 A, U.S.
Army , Staff Evidence Analysis, 8 December 1947, attaching NG [Nuremberg trial
document] 4137.
42

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol43/iss1/2

22

Halbrook: The Swiss And The Nazis

26

Review

[February

This intrigue against Switzerland in the last months of the war indicates
the degree to which she was still under threat of Nazi attack. The full extent
of the Nazi threat to Switzerland during World War II has never been
adequately documented or acknowledged. This study seeks to contribute to
an understanding of that subject, which is not even mentioned in the studies
by the governmental "expert" commissions published in the late 1990s and
early 2000s in the United States and Switzerland. The reality was that the
Swiss patriots, rifles in hand, stood up to the Nazis, threatening an
unacceptable loss of German blood in the event of an invasion.
Chapter 11. Intruders in Our midst

The 1936 assassination of the German Nazi Wilhelm Gustloff by David
Frankfurter, a Jewish medical student from Yugoslavia, was a watershed
event that would bring Davos onto the center stage of Swiss-German
relations. The Nazis viewed Frankfurter as a cold-blooded Jewish murderer.
The Swiss, by contrast, saw Frankfurter as either a misguided but
sympathetic youth or as a modem-day William Tell.
Rather than leading to the persecution of Jews, the Gustloff affair led
the Swiss to clamp down on Nazi organizations within the country.
Germany was outraged. The homicide and ensuing trial dramatically
escalated Nazi hatred of Switzerland. German officials attended
Frankfurter's trial daily. The Nazis elevated Gustloff as National
Socialism's first martyr abroad.
Between 1943 and 1945, 166 American planes landed or crashed in
Switzerland. Allied planes came to Switzerland as a place of refuge after
being damaged in battle or because of spent fuel or mechanical failure.
Some 1,742 Americans, mostly airmen, would be safely interned in
Switzerland during the war. The American airmen who were officers were
interned at the Palace Hotel in Davos.
Armin Camenisch, who was born in 1933, recollects: "We boys in Chur
did not go to the air raid shelters, but instead often watched the fleets of
American B 17 and B24 bombers and the attacking German fighters which
flew overhead.
"On November 16, 1944, at the town of Malix, I saw a B24 crash. The
Swiss Home Guard appeared with rifles. The Americans thought they were
dead and cried, 'Please don't shoot!' The Home Guard did not know who
the Americans were, but one soldier said 'Schweizer,' and then the
Americans knew they were in Switzerland. The only Swiss there who spoke
English was a young girl. The pilot gave her his parachute and her mother
later made blouses from it! They were all reunited in 1998.
[Note: The American flyers later formed the Swiss Internees
Association, under the leadership of Bob Long. Their numbers have
dwindled over the years, but their most recent annual meeting was October
22, 2006.]
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Lists of subversives were drawn up with an explicitly ominous
intention. Swiss patriots in the Davos area originated their own secret Local
Defense organizations by 1937, three years before the Swiss military created
the Confederation-wide Ortswehr, in which 120,000 armed volunteers
served in more than 2,800 communities. These local organizations made
lists so that Nazi sympathizers could be rounded up and imprisoned or
executed in the event of a German onslaught.
Chapter 12. America's Window on the Reich: Allen Dulles in Bern

The recent declassification and publication in 1996 of many of Allen
Dulles' OSS dispatches from Bern shed new light on the significant role
played by Switzerland in the struggle against Nazism. 45
For instance, Dulles urged planning from London to help organize
French guerrilla warfare and resistance programs. "For reasons explain[ed]
separately 511 proving cooperative and this greatly facilitates the
maintenance of communications across the border with groups." The
number 511 was the code number for the Swiss intelligence service, headed
by Roger Masson, who Dulles referred to as "Bones." Dulles did not
identify specific Swiss agents when using the number 511. What was
significant was that "511" cooperated with OSS assistance to the French
resistance.
In a telegram in mid-March 1944, Dulles expressed concern about a
meeting between Swiss intelligence chief Roger Masson and Walter
Schellenberg of the Gestapo. Dulles believed that "the controlling Swiss
authorities have a basic desire for an Allied victory," but others hoped for a
compromise peace. Dulles thus presented evidence of possible leaks "in
strictest secrecy to the highest Swiss Quarters" - headed by General Henri
Guisan, commander of the Swiss armed forces. Dulles continued:
General Guisan has just indicated his wish for a confidential
conversation with me ....
I am convinced that his integrity and
devotion to our ideals are unimpeachable ....
Dulles used the code name "Castle" as a general indicator for messages
dealing with the German threat to Switzerland. Under this category Dulles
sent a telegram recording his March 1944 meeting with General Guisan as
follows:
Recently I talked to General G. [Guisan] .... I think that his reason
for requesting a talk with me was to try to gain some indication of
whether or not it is probable that France will be invaded in the near
future. It is evident that he fears the threat to Switzerland present in
45
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the fact that the Nazis may wish to use Swiss railroads to transport
Nazi forces into safety in the event of a retreat of the Germans from
the South in case the attack is carried on simultaneously in the
North and South. We have assigned General G. our 839.
Thus, General Guisan became code number "839," a standard OSS practice
to protect the identities of contacts in case the message was intercepted.
During the unfolding of the Allied campaigns, Guisan informed Dulles
of the following shocking intelligence: "A report concerning Nazi
preparations for bacteriological warfare was being carefully checked by
839's SI [Guisan's Secret Intelligence] services. According to rumor,
scientific experiments were conducted in laboratories at Lyon; the product
was produced then forwarded to Leipzig."
On November 3, 1944, Dulles met with General Guisan, who passed on
intelligence that Hitler appeared to have made a speedy recovery from the
July 20 attack, but was later bedridden for three months due to cerebral
hemorrhage caused by shock .... Guisan ("839") then addressed a different,
sensitive topic, accidental American bombings of Switzerland:
839, who is a good friend of ours, was obviously seriously
disturbed at repetition of our bombing attacks on Swiss towns and
villages .... Assume everything being done to prevent recurrence.
Swiss intelligence would play an instrumental role in Operation Sunrise,
secret negotiations over two months which resulted in the surrender of
German forces in Italy. On March 8, 1945, Dulles and a Swiss intermediary
met with SS General Karl Wolff. Dulles reported on April 24 about SS
General Wolff s visit of the previous week to Berlin in an attempt to
persuade Hitler and the Nazi leadership to surrender. Wolff had provided
this information to two Swiss intermediaries in the surrender negotiations,
Swiss intelligence Major Max Weibel and Professor Max Husmann. Wolff
got the same reaction from Hitler as Dulles had from the Allied leadership:
German forces in Italy would not be allowed to surrender to the Americans.
Despite the intransigence on both sides to prevent the surrender of the
German forces in Italy, on April 26 the Joint Chiefs of Staff relented and
directed that SS General Wolff could proceed to Allied Force Headquarters
in Caserta to surrender. A Soviet representative would be present. On May
2, the Wehrmacht forces in Italy surrendered.
Most telling is that the two major sources which are critical of
Switzerland's role during the Second World War - the politically-driven
United States' Eizenstat-Slany report (1997) and Switzerland's Bergier
Commission report (2002) - fail to include any reference to Allen Dulles,
the OSS, or to Switzerland's role as America's window on the Reich.
Perhaps in the future the full documentation of Swiss cooperation with
American intelligence will be brought to light.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2007

25

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 43 [2007], No. 1, Art. 2
2007]

29

The Swiss and the Nazis

[For more detail, the following has more recently been published:
Halbrook, "Operation Sunrise: America's OSS, Swiss Intelligence, and the
German Surrender 1945," in "Operation Sunrise". Atti del convegno
internazionale (Locarno, 2 maggio 2005), a cura di Marino Vigano Dominic M. Pedrazzini (Lugano: Lepori e Storni Arti Grafiche, 2006).]

Conclusion
Like the Americans, the Swiss had their own "Greatest Generation," and
it included all of those who were ready to lay down their lives had the Nazi
hordes come over the border. How tiny Switzerland stood down the Nazi
monolith is a lesson worth remembering in the annals of human freedom.
Stephen P. Halbrook
Fairfax, Virginia
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